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Marci Hill Jordan

mjordan@stark-stark.com
856.874.4421

Marci Hill Jordan is a Shareholder in the Workers’ Compensation Group. She has been concentrating on representing injured workers in their Worker' Compensation Claims and Social Security Disability Appeals for over 19 years. Prior to joining Stark & Stark, Ms. Jordan was associated with the firm of Tomar, O’Brien, Jacoby & Graziano in Cherry Hill, New Jersey.

Entries authored by Marci Hill Jordan

How Are Wages Calculated in Workers' Compensation Cases?

While an injured worker is out of work under the care of an authorized workers’ compensation physician they are entitled to be paid 70% of average weekly wages if they miss work for more than seven days.  There is always a lot of concern and disagreement over the calculation of the average weekly wage.   Most workers’ compensation attorneys rely on a calculation where the 26 weeks of wages prior to the accident are averaged and multiplied by 70% to calculate the weekly temporary disability rate.  A careful reading of the statute below shows that the 26 week average rate only applied to employees performing piece work, a type of work that is not very common nowadays, not to the average hourly employee.

The statue governing the calculation of wages and rate for worker's compensation in New Jersey is N.J.S.A. 34:15-37.  This section of the statute states in part the following:
"Wages," when used in this chapter shall be construed to mean the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the accident. Where prior to the accident, the rate of wages is fixed by the output of the employee, the daily wages shall be calculated by dividing the number of days the worker was actually employed into the total amount the employee earned during the preceding six months, or so much thereof as shall refer to employment by the same employer. When the rate of wages is fixed by the hour, the daily wage shall be found by multiplying the hourly rate by the customary number of working days constituting an ordinary week in the character of the work involved; providing however, if the employee worked less than the customary number of working days constituting an ordinary week in the character of the work involved, the weekly wage for the purposes of compensation under provisions of R.S. 34:15-12a only shall be found by multiplying the hourly rate by the number of hours of work regularly performed by that employee in the character of the work involved.


Therefore it is clear that for hourly employees, the correct way to calculate wage and rate is to determine the customary work week, and the normal rate of pay and multiply to calculate a weekly wage. The above section of the statute seems fairly clear, however there are always important issues that come up in calculating the wage and rate in workers’ compensation cases.  The wage and rate effect temporary and permanency weekly payments,  For any questions regarding the New Jersey workers’ compensation statute please contact Stark and Stark.

 

Don't Wait to Report an Injury to Your Employer, or You May be Out of Luck!

The New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Statute section  N.J.S.A. 34:15-17 requires injuries to be reported within 90 days of a work accident.  A recent case, Ader v. Lebanon Township, addresses this section of the statute, and confirms the importance of reporting accidents within 90 days. This section of the statute is designed to give the employer the benefit of timely investigation into the accident.  The employee in the above case waited 15 months to report his injury to his employer, and thus was denied workers’ compensation benefits by the court.

The employee worked as a volunteer EMT for the Township of Lebanon.  On November 18, 2008, this employee climbed onto the back of a tow-truck to investigate an accident, and when he jumped off of the truck he felt pain in his low back.  He did not report this accident to his employer or request medical care.  A few weeks later he felt pain in his hips so he went to his own doctor and spoke about the work incident jumping off of the truck, but not until two months after the accident.  Eleven months after the accident his own doctor sent him to a surgeon who diagnosed a serious condition that would require hip replacements.  The employee told the surgeon about the pain he experienced after jumping off of the tow-truck at work.  The employee finally reported the accident to the Township in February of 2010.

The Township denied the claim on the basis of the above “Notice” statute, and took the position that this employee waited too long to report his injury.  The employee’s position was that he really did not know his condition was work related until the surgeon told him so.  The Court rejected his argument, and found that the employee knew he was injured on November 18, 2008, or shortly thereafter, and held that he should have reported the event to his employer within 90 days.  He certainly knew of the relationship when he saw his own doctor a few weeks after the accident.

This recent case shows how important it is to notify your employer as soon as possible if you get injured at work.  Even if you do not feel you need medical care immediately, it is still best to cover yourself by letting your employer know you were involved in an accident.  And certainly the minute you feel you need medical care you must let your employer know you were injured at work, and ask for medical treatment.  Then call Stark & Stark and we can help you through the process.

Marci Hill Jordan is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Marlton, New Jersey office, concentrating in Workers’ Compensation Law. For more information, please contact Ms. Jordan.

Workers' Compensation Benefits - Are They Payable to the Family if the Injured Worker Dies?

The final step in a workers’ compensation claim is the payment of partial or total permanency benefits to the injured worker. My clients frequently ask me if their spouse or family will receive their benefits it they die either before they get their permanency award, or during the pendency of the award. The answer to this question depends on the cause of death, and whether or not the injured worker has “dependents” as defined by law. There are several sections of the New Jersey Statute that address these issues:

N.J.S.A. 34:15-12 (e) addresses the issue of what happens when a person has been awarded partial or total permanency benefits and then they die. The statute says that if the person dies from any cause other than the work accident during the time period that they are receiving benefits for a permanent injury, the remaining benefits will be paid to the deceased person’s dependents. If there are no dependents the remaining money, not to exceed $3500, will be paid in a lump sum to the proper person for burial and funeral expenses. However in the case where a person is receiving total and permanent disability benefits, no payments are due to anyone else other than the injured worker after benefits have been paid in excess of 450 weeks.

N.J.S.A.34:15-13 (h) addresses the issue of what happens if the death results from an accident or occupational disease. In that case, whether there are dependents or not, the workers’ compensation carrier pays for the medical bills for the final illness and the funeral costs not to exceed $3500. In addition, the statute provides for an ongoing weekly compensation to dependents only, not to exceed a total of 70% of wages, up to a maximum set yearly by statute.

N.J.S.A.34:15-13 (f) defines “dependents” for workers’ compensation purposes. Of course a spouse or minor child being supported by the decedent are included in this definition. However there are other categories of dependents, and the statute must be reviewed carefully to make a final determination. Of note, a fiancé or “common law” spouse are not included in this definition.

 Please contact the Workers’ Compensation Attorneys at Stark and Stark for any questions about workers’ compensation benefits.

 Marci Hill Jordan is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Marlton, New Jersey office, concentrating in Workers’ Compensation Law. For more information, please contact Ms. Jordan.

The Smart Act Addresses Medicare Conditional Payments

As I had advised in a past blog post, the receipt of Medicare benefits by a workers’ compensation claimant can significantly delay the settlement process in a workers’ compensation case.  Under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, anyone who is eligible for Medicare must contact Medicare prior to settling a workers’ compensation claim to determine if Medicare made payments for which another source (workers’ compensation) should be responsible.  In the past, when we were required to obtain a statement of payments made by Medicare prior to a settlement, Medicare had no guidelines or time lines for their part in this process.  Fortunately steps have been taken by the Federal Government to partially rectify this situation.

On January 10, 2013, President Obama signed the Strengthening Medicare and Repaying Taxpayers Act (SMART Act) into law.

The Secretary of Health and Human Services will soon be required to maintain a website that allows Medicare Beneficiaries to access information about claims and services paid by Medicare. Parties are required to provide Medicare with 120 days notice before they expect settlement of a workers’ compensation case to take place.  Medicare will then have 65 days from the receipt of this notice to provide the Medicare reimbursement amount, a period which can be extended by 30 days by Medicare. After this time has expired, the parties can rely on the Medicare reimbursement amount obtained from the website if the settlement occurs within 120 days of the notice, and within three business days from the last download of the reimbursement amount from the website.

What does this mean to a workers’ compensation claimant?  If their case settles and they receive their Workers’ Compensation Award during this 120 day period then the last statement of conditional payments made by Medicare that was downloaded during this period shall constitute the final amount subject to recovery by Medicare.  This is a joy to behold.  Before this law was made, we would have to wait months for a statement of conditional payments.  Even after we received the statement there was no guarantee that Medicare would then not issue another statement after the settlement asking for more money to be reimbursed to Medicare than was requested prior to settlement.  The process as it stands now is a nightmare for workers and their attorneys.  The Secretary of Health and Human Services has until September 10, 2013 to implement these regulations. Congratulations to Congress for passing this SMART Act.

For more information about this new act, please click here, click here or click here 

Please contact the Workers’ Compensation Team at Stark and Stark with any questions.

Marci Hill Jordan is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Marlton, New Jersey office, concentrating in Workers’ Compensation Law. For more information, please contact Ms. Jordan.

 

Part Time "Light Duty" Work

On September 7, 2012, the Honorable Emille Cox, Judge of Workers Compensation in Camden, decided a Motion in favor of my client that will benefit many injured workers in the State of New Jersey when the workers’ compensation carrier requires a worker to return to work light duty, or part time, and that work results in less pay than the temporary disability rate. In this case I filed a Motion on behalf of my client, Mr. Soto, requested that his part time wages be supplemented by temporary disability benefits.

The facts were pretty simple. Mr. Soto was returned to work light duty for 4 hours a day by the authorized treating doctor. His pay by the employer for the 20 hours a week was significantly less that the temporary disability rate he was receiving from the workers’ compensation carrier while he was out of work totally. I asked the employer/carrier to make up the difference between the part time pay and the workers’ compensation temporary disability rate and they objected. They argued that since the petitioner was returned to minimal light duty work, his temporary disability benefits should be limited by the amount earned in the light duty capacity. Our argument was that limiting Mr. Soto to 20 hours a week was the decision of the authorized treating physician, and that this limitation imposed a severe financial penalty on Mr. Soto, yet gave a benefit to the employer. Mr. Soto was follow the authorized doctor’s orders, yet was receiving a paycheck almost one-third of the amount he was receiving while he was totally out of work under this same doctor’s care. We argued that if this was allowed all employers/carriers would return their workers to work part time after an injury and thus have the benefit of paying them only part time wages, and not the full workers’ compensation temporary disability rate. Judge Cox noted that part time unemployment benefits are paid to workers who are reduced to part time work, and felt that workers’ compensation benefits should be on par for injured workers. Judge Cox agreed with our argument, and in a Reserved Decision he found that allowing a respondent to provide only minimal part time work and to then reduce a petitioner's temporary disability benefits would defeat the purpose of the temporary disability provisions of the workers' compensation statutes. Mr. Soto’s Motion was granted. For any temporary disability issues, please contact the Workers’ Compensation Team at Stark and Stark.

Marci Hill Jordan is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Marlton, New Jersey office, concentrating in Workers’ Compensation Law. For more information, please contact Ms. Jordan.

 

Fraud Statute

N.J.S.A. 34:15-57.4, commonly known as the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Fraud Statute, is paraphrased below as it relates to an injured worker making a claim for benefits.

A person shall:

(a) Be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if the person knowingly or purposely:

When making a claim for Workers’ Compensation benefits, makes a false or misleading statement, representation or submission concerning any material fact;

(b) Any person who violates the above shall be civilly liable to any person injured by the above violation.

(c) (1) If a person knowingly or purposely violates this statute the Workers’ Compensation Division may order immediate termination or denial of benefits, and forfeiture of any future benefits/rights.

(2) If a violation is found, the person has to pay back the benefits received plus simple interest.

(d) Nothing in this section shall preclude indictment and conviction for a violation of Title 2C of the NJ Statutes.

For example, an injured worker makes a claim for treatment for a cervical spine injury that happened at work in 2012. The Employer’s attorney discovered a prior cervical MRI from 2002 that showed a C5- 6 disc herniation and used that to stop paying benefits, and filed a counter- motion to relieve the employer of any responsibility under the above Fraud Statute. The injured worker told all treating physicians that he had a prior 2002 biking injury, however he stated to all physicians, that the prior injury was to his right shoulder. He did not reveal the fact that he had a cervical MRI in 2002 to any current physician. He also did not recall being told by any prior physicians that he had any significant cervical injury, and felt that he had only injured his right shoulder in the 2002 biking accident.

The issue is whether the workers’s failure to reveal the prior 2002 cervical MRI to the treating physicians for his 2012 injury was a knowingly or purposely made false or misleading statement to obtain workers compensation benefits. I would argue that the failure to reveal the prior MRI was not fraudulent in any way. Dr Grey, the treating doctor from the 2012 accident states in his report the he spoke with him (the worker) about the previous cervical MRI findings, and he was surprised to learn that he had experienced a previous disc herniation at the same level where he was operated on. He is adamant that his prior treating doctor in 2002 never advised him of any neck concerns, and there is no reason in any of the records which I have been provided to disbelieve the patient in that regard.”

It is clear that the injured worker told all treating doctors about his prior 2002 shoulder injury. He did not specifically mention a cervical injury because in his mind he injured and had surgery to his right shoulder, not his neck. It is reasonable to assume that 10 years after a prior injury, a worker would not remember he had a cervical MRI, when he did not get any treatment for his neck and had no complaints for his neck. It is also likely the Employer would never be able to prove that this worker made a false or misleading statement because the standard of proof for 34:15-57.4 (a), which involves a crime of the fourth degree, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. That type of proof would never be possible in this case.

Please call Stark and Stark’s workers’ compensation department for all of your workers’ compensation questions.

Marci Hill Jordan is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Marlton, New Jersey office, concentrating in Workers’ Compensation Law. For more information, please contact Ms. Jordan.

Fraud and Workers' Compensation

In Johnnie Jackson v. Township of Montclair, Mr. Jackson injured his right knee while moving books at the Montclair Public library during the course of his employment on August 4, 2008.  He was provided with medical care through the workers compensation carrier, including surgery on his knee.  The workers’ compensation doctors wrote in their reports that Mr. Jackson denied any prior right knee injuries.  Contrary to what he told the treating doctors, Mr. Jackson had been involved in an automobile accident on April 13, 2007 and had treated with a surgeon who ordered an MRI that revealed significant problems in this same knee, and who had recommended surgery.  Mr. Jackson did not have knee surgery after the car accident.  Mr. Jackson filed a law suit for the car accident, and signed statements under oath that the knee injury he sustained in the car accident was permanent in nature, and caused pain on a daily basis.

The Township of Montclair ultimately sent Mr. Jackson to a doctor for an Independent Medical Exam for the work injury.  That doctor became aware of the prior motor vehicle accident where Mr. Jackson injured this same knee.  After review of the records from the motor vehicle accident this doctor stated that the work injury only caused a sprain and strain of the right knee, and that the recent surgery was really needed because of the injuries that happened in the motor vehicle accident, not the work accident.  A trial of the workers’ compensation case took place where Mr. Jackson testified that before the work injury of 8/4/2008 his right knee felt great.  When cross examined with the contrary sworn statements from his motor vehicle law suit, he testified that some of those statements had been wrong, and that he had signed them without reviewing them.   Mr. Jackson also testified that he did not recall being told that he had a tear in his right knee after the car accident, but later admitted being told that he needed surgery.   He said he had no idea why the treating workers’ compensation doctors had no knowledge of the prior car accident.

Montclair Township filed to dismiss Mr. Jackson’s worker’ compensation claim alleging he violating the New Jersey Fraud Act by failing to tell the workers’ compensation treating doctors about his prior right knee injury.   The  Judge of Compensation dismissed the workers’ compensation case finding fraud, and ordered Mr. Jackson to pay back to the workers’ compensation carrier most of the benefits they had paid on his behalf, including benefits paid for medical care.  Mr. Jackson appealed, and the Appellate Division agreed with the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s finding that since he had explicitly denied having any prior right knee injuries, he had committed fraud in the workers’ compensation case.

Marci Hill Jordan is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Marlton, New Jersey office, concentrating in Workers’ Compensation Law. For more information, please contact Ms. Jordan.

The Supreme Court Has Now Ruled On Suing a Workers' Compensation Carrier For "Bad Faith"

In the recent case of Stancil v. ACE USA, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered whether an injured employee may sue his employer’s workers compensation carrier for pain and suffering caused by the insurance carrier’s wifull delay in paying for medical treatment.  Unfortunately the Supreme Court’s answer was “NO.”  

The case arose out of a workers’ compensation claim filed by Wade Stancil after he was injured in 1995.  He received benefits from the carrier (ACE) and in 2006 the workers’ compensation Judge determined that Mr. Stancil was totally disabled. Thereafter Mr. Stancil filed a motion for  payment of outstanding medical bills.  During the motion hearing, the workers’ compensation Judge commented that ACE had a history of failing to make payments when ordered to do so.  The motion was granted on September 12, 2007, and the Judge warned ACE against any further delay in payment.  The parties returned to court on October 29, 2007 because the bills had not been paid.  The Judge found that the failure to pay the bills was a willful violation by ACE and issued an order awarding counsel fees to Mr. Stancil’s attorney and ordering ACE to pay the bills immediately.  The workers’ compensation Judge commented that he had exhausted all remedies available to him to enforce the order, and suggested that Mr. Stancil seek further relief in the Superior Court.  

In 2008 Mr Stancil had additional surgery and psychiatric treatment.  His physician attributed the need for additional treatment to delay caused by ACE’s failure to pay medical bills in a timely manner.   Thereafter Mr. Stancil filed suit in Superior Court claiming that ACE had required him to attend examinations with physicians of their choosing, yet refused to provide the treatment that their own physicians recommended, to his detriment.   Mr. Stancil’s complaint in Superior Court alleged that the workers’ compensation court’s Orders for treatment were ignored by ACE, causing him pain and suffering, and a worsening of his condition.

The attorney for ACE filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing that the Workers’ Compensation Statute does not allow for such “bad faith’ suits against workers’ compensation carriers, and that the only remedy available to Mr. Stancil is that which is available in the Workers Compensation Act.  The trial court granted ACE’s motion to dismiss and stated that recent amendments to the Workers’ Compensation Act were enacted to address this type of situation.  The Appellate Division affirmed for the same reasons as the trial court, and  rejected Mr. Stancil’s alternative argument that the employer can be sued under the Workers’ Compensation Statute’s intentional wrong exception.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification for the limited purpose of determining whether “an employee who suffered a work-related injury has a common-law cause of action for damages against a workers’ compensation carrier for its willful failure to comply with court orders compelling it to provide medical treatment when the delay or denial of treatment causes a worsening of the employee’s medical condition and/or pain and suffering.”  
After a review of the statutory amendments enacted by the Legislature in 2008 --- that adopted a remedy allowing workers’ compensation judges to use contempt powers against recalcitrant carriers --- the Supreme Court held that an injured employee does not have the common law right to sue a workers’ compensation carrier for pain and suffering because of the carrier’s delay.  The Courts stated that the Legislature had considered this type of situation in 2008 when it amended the Workers’ Compensation Act, and rejected certain penalties in favor of granting contempt powers to workers’ compensation judges.  The Court felt that allowing law suits for pain and suffering would open the flood gates for injured workers to sue in Superior Court instead of pursing their cases in the Division of Workers’ Compensation, and would “obliterate the Legislature’s system of workers’ compensation...”  In short, the Court did not find it necessary to fashion an alternative way for injured workers to address their problems with carriers other than through the workers’ compensation court.

As a workers’ compensation practitioner, I disagree wholeheartedly with the decision of the majority in Stancil, and believe that the dissenting opinion by Justin Albin hit the nail precisely on the head.  The cases where one could potentially sue for the pain and suffering that Mr. Stancil experienced are far and few between.  Workers’ compensation carriers delay daily in payment of benefits to workers causing extreme hardship, however it is not that often that carriers wilfully refuse to obey the Order of a Worker’ Compensation Judge.   The Supreme Court should have allowed a common law cause of action for pain and suffering in the few cases where a carrier wilfully refuses to obey a Judge’s order.  As Justice Albin opined, “This case represents a carrier’s intentional and unilateral shredding of the social compact embodied in the Workers’ Compensation Act.....I do not believe that the Act was intended to protect a carrier that displays absolute contempt for the law, thus causing disastrous consequences to a worker within its charge.”

Marci Hill Jordan is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Marlton, New Jersey office, concentrating in Workers’ Compensation Law. For more information, please contact Ms. Jordan.

Is Your Housekeeper Covered Under Your Homeowner's Policy if She is Injured While Working?

In a recent case in New Jersey, Luz Lukasik agreed to provide house cleaning services for Marguerite Hollaway.  Ms. Lukasik had several other homes that she cleaned in addition to the Hollaway residence.  The parties agreed that Ms. Hollaway would pay Ms. Lukasik $100 per day to clean her home.  On her first day on the job, Ms. Lukasik fell off a stool and fractured her hand.  She obtained medical care, but eventually came back to the Hollaway house one more day to clean.  On that second day, she had helpers do the work, and in fact did not actually do any of the  work herself.  Disagreements arose over who was to purchase the cleaning supplies, and Ms. Lukasik never returned to do any more work at the Hollaway residence after that second day.  

Ms. Lukasik filed a workers’ compensation claim asserting that she was employed by  Ms. Hollaway when she was injured that first day on the job.  The Judge of Compensation found that Ms. Lukasik was an employee under the “right of control test.”  The Judge focused on the fact that Ms. Hollaway picked the day of the week for the work to be done, expected Ms. Lukasik to clean on a regular basis, and had the ability to direct her work, even if she chose not to do so.  In other words, the Workers’ Compensation Judge found that Ms. Hollaway controlled Ms. Lukasik’s work activities such that she would be considered an employee.  The Judge then awarded partial permanency benefits to Ms. Lukasik under the workers’ compensation statute.   Ms. Hollaway appealed on the theory that Mr. Lukasik was an independent contractor, and not an employee subject to the workers’ compensation laws. 

On appeal, the Appellate Division found that there was insufficient control of Ms. Lukasik’s work activities to constitute an employer/employee relationship. The Court relied on the fact that Ms. Hollaway did not control how Ms. Lukasik did her cleaning, what supplies she used, or who did the cleaning. The court pointed to the fact that on the second day of cleaning Ms. Lukasik did not do any of the cleaning herself, but rather directed her daughter and a friend to do the work.  The court stated that if Ms. Lukasik was an employee she would not have the option to substitute another worker in her place.  Moreover since Ms. Lukasik purchased her own cleaning supplies and set her own price, the court found that Ms. Hollaway did not control Ms. Lukasik’s work, and therefore she was not an employee eligible for workers’ compensation benefits.  The law holds that true independent contractors are NOT eligible for workers’ compensation benefits.  For any questions regarding your right to workers’ compensation benefits please call the law firm of Stark and Stark.

Marci Hill Jordan is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Marlton, New Jersey office, concentrating in Workers’ Compensation Law. For more information, please contact Ms. Jordan.

Suing an Employer for Negligence

In a recent case,  Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corporation, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found in favor of the employer and against the injured worker who was suing his employer for intentional harm.

The injured worker, Mr. Van Dunk, was employed as a laborer for James Construction.  The project was behind schedule because there had been an extreme amount of rain.  Mr. Van Dunk was part of a team of employees who were doing excavation and construction of a trench that had to be lined with fabric. The crew experienced problems in stretching the fabric over the trench, and Mr. Van Dunk volunteered to go into the trench and fix the fabric.  However Mr. Van Dunk’s supervisor told him not to go into the trench because of the dangerous conditions that existed.  

Eventually the supervisor changed his mind and told Mr. Van Dunk to go in to the trench to stretch the fabric, in violation of an OSHA directive not to do so.  Immediately after entering the trench Mr. Van Dunk was buried up to his chest in mud and dirt as the trench collapsed on him causing significant injuries.  The employer was charged with a willful OSHA violation and fined.

Mr. Van Dunk filed a law suit against his employer on the grounds that the supervisor sending him into the trench was in violation of OSHA and was intentionally wrong, and an exception to the general rule that an employee can’t sue an employer for negligence.  At trial, the Judge dismissed the employee’s lawsuit stating that the only action Mr. Van Dunk can take under the law is to file a workers’ compensation case.  Mr. Van Dunk appealed and the Appellate Division found that the company intentionally disregarded his safety in an effort to “increase defendant’s profit and productivity,” and allowed the suit to continue.  The employer then appealed to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  

The Supreme Court found that while the acts of the employer were reckless, they did not have the requisite intent to harm that is required for an employee to be able to sue an employer for negligence.  The Supreme Court also found that the actions of the employer, and the resulting injury to Mr. Van Dunk, were not so far outside the bounds of what could happen in this type of work environment as to make the harm intentional on the part of the employer.   The Court confirmed the long standing law that in New Jersey an employee is only able to file a workers’ compensation claim, unless they can prove intentional harm on the part of the employer.  

Marci Hill Jordan is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Marlton, New Jersey office, specializing in Workers’ Compensation Law. For more information, please contact Ms. Jordan.

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